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This special issue (short: S.I.) is dedicated to the study of philosophical 
methodology. Until recently, the debate about philosophical methods in 
analytic philosophy primarily focused on the method of conceptual analysis, 
linguistic intuitions, thought experiments, and empirical methods. The result 
of an analysis of a concept is typically taken to be an explicit definition that 
consists of a list of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for 
its fulfillment. Yet, such a list is only a result of a conceptual analysis if it is true 
by virtue of the meaning of its parts and if this truth can be recognized a priori 
with the aid of linguistic intuitions (e.g., Grice 1958). We can test definitions by 
conducting thought experiments that enact the specified conditions (e.g., Mach 
1973; Jackson 1998, ch. 2; Nimtz 2012). This method of conceptual clarification 
has been criticized in several respects. For instance, Willard van Orman Quine 
challenged one of its presuppositions, namely the analytic/synthetic distinction 
(Quine 1951). Hilary Kornblith argued that its aim of specifying individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient condition cannot be reached (Kornblith 2007; 
see also Chalmers and Jackson 2001). Longstanding debates about concepts like 
knowledge are thus rather a gimmick than fruitful philosophical work 
(Kornblith 2014). Lynne Rudder Baker aimed to show that empirical 
considerations are involved in seemingly a priori analyses (Rudder Baker 2001), 
and it has been debated whether conceptual analysis is knowledge expanding 
(for this debate see, e.g., Balcerak Jackson and Balcerak Jackson 2012; Balcerak 
Jackson 2013). In recent years, it has also been argued that conceptual analysis 
should not be carried out by individual philosophers. Instead, folk intuitions 
need to be elicited by means of quantitative research. Such arguments led to 
the rise of so-called experimental philosophy (e.g., Knobe and Nichols 2008; 
Horvath and Grundmann 2012), and to even more debates about the nature of 
conceptual analysis (e.g., Nimtz 2012), the role of thought experiments within 
it (e.g., Williamson 2007; Nimtz 2010; Malmgren 2011; Grundmann and 
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Horvath 2014), the epistemic status of counterfactual conditionals, which are 
central for the latter (e.g., Williamson 2007), and about the notion of conceptual 
truth (e.g., Nimtz 2009).  
 The S.I. at hand supplements this debate about philosophical 
methodology by placing emphasis on other methods and debates. Its focus is 
on explication, conceptual (re-)engineering, the application of formal methods, 
and other methodological considerations that are central for philosophical 
practice and have not received enough attention in the literature. A common 
feature of many methods that are discussed in this S.I. is the sharpening of 
concepts. Rudolf Carnap (1950) coined the method of explication. He suggested 
to replace the concept of interest, the explicandum, with a similar explicatum, 
which needs to be fruitful, simple, and exact. In contrast to conceptual analysis, 
not all uses of the concept need to be captured. Instead, problematic uses are 
meant to be excluded when specifying the explicatum. Quine demanded that 
explication should replace conceptual analysis in many parts of philosophy 
(Quine 1960). However, apart from a brief debate between Strawson (1963) and 
Carnap (1963), the method of explication was only sparsely employed (Hanna 
1968; Craig 1990; Boniolo 2003; Maher 2007) until recently. Within the past 
couple of years, however, its popularity rose (e.g., Brun 2016), especially within 
epistemology (e.g., Brendel 2013; Olsson 2015; Eder ms.) and philosophy of 
science (e.g., Schupbach and Sprenger 2011; Justus 2012; van Riel 2014; 
Schupbach 2017). Some philosophers (e.g., Brun 2016) consider Carnapian 
explication to be a method among a broader family of method that recently 
gained more interest, namely so-called conceptual (re-)engineering, whose aim is 
to redefine concepts or even to introduce new ones for particular purposes. This 
ameliorative method is concerned with how a concept should function (e.g., 
Haslanger 2000; Burgess and Plunkett 2013; Fassio and McKenna 2015). 
Conceptual (re-)engineering has been applied in recent philosophy with the 
purpose to change society. Examples are the re-engineering of the concepts of 
race and of gender (e.g., Haslanger 2012). Prima facie, Carnapian explication and 
conceptual (re-)engineering resemble the use of formal methods to clarify 
concepts, such as the concept of (degrees of) belief (e.g., Huber and Schmidt-
Petri 2009; Spohn 2012; Leitgeb 2013, 2014, 2015), coherence (e.g., Bovens and 
Hartmann 2003; Olsson 2005), confirmation (e.g., Earman 1992), or causality 
(e.g., Pearl 2000). As in the case of explication, not all uses of the concept in 
question are meant to be captured and the resulting definitions should be 
fruitful, simple, and exact.  
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Reflections on these less discussed philosophical methods are of 
fundamental importance for many debates taking place in contemporary 
philosophy, such as the debate about ameliorative projects within social and 
political philosophy, the knowledge-first approach in epistemology, the a 
priori/a posteriori distinction in the philosophy of language, and the distinction 
between verbal vs. non-verbal disagreement as well as the debate about 
armchair philosophy in philosophy in general. The S.I. contains 12 papers that 
provide new thought-provoking proposals for these debates.  
 
The first six papers of this S.I. investigate the method of Carnapian 
explication, by offering reconstructions of Carnap’s account of explication or 
by comparing it to related methods and addressing some of the criticisms that 
have been raised against it. 
Georg Brun’s paper “Conceptual Re-Engineering: From Explication to 
Reflective Equilibrium” deals with two prominent philosophical methods: 
Carnapian explication and the equally well-known method of reflective 
equilibrium as developed by Nelson Goodman. Brun focuses on unappreciated 
relations between Carnap's method and Goodman’s theory of constructive 
definitions and his account of reflective equilibrium, which, as he shows, can 
also be understood as a method of conceptual engineering. In his instructive 
paper, Brun investigates the historical and structural relations between those 
methods and argues that they can be understood “as aspects of one method" 
that contributes to theory development in philosophy as well as in science. 
Brun considers Goodman’s method of reflective equilibrium to be a “further 
development" of Carnap’s explication. He argues for three main points: (i) 
conceptual re-engineering should deal with sets of concepts and theories rather 
than focus on single concepts, (ii) it should be conceived of as a method of 
mutual adjustments, which (iii) are guided by adequacy requirements 
analogous to those of Carnapian explication. 
Mark Pinder’s contribution “On Strawson’s Critique of Explication as a 
Method in Philosophy” explores the limits and prospects of the method of 
explication as coined by Rudolf Carnap. He does so by thoroughly discussing 
P.F. Strawson’s famous criticism of it (which is also addressed in Catarina 
Dutilh Novaes’s and Eve Kitsik’s contribution to this S.I.). As is well-known, 
Carnapian explication is a method of conceptual clarification that replaces an 
imprecise concept—mostly from everyday language—by a concept that 
satisfies the adequacy requirements of being more precise, yet similar in use, 
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fruitful and simple. It does not need to be maximally similar. Strawson’s 
criticism of this method is commonly conceived of as a criticism of the 
philosophical usefulness of such a method of explication.  According to Pinder, 
the criticism is considered to be that, when it comes to philosophical problems, 
the method of explication serves only to change the subject—rather than to 
solve the problem. It does so by simply replacing a concept central to the 
problem in question by a more precise technical concept that is not central to it. 
Pinder argues that this understanding of Strawson’s criticism is not warranted 
in its full generality. He argues that whether the method of explication can 
contribute to solving a particular philosophical problem depends on the 
purpose of the explication in question, how the particular problem is construed, 
and the elaboration of the explication 
In “The Constituents of an Explication” Moritz Cordes develops a 
formal reconstruction of the explication relation, building on previous work by 
Geo Siegwart (1997a, b). Taking explicata to be terms, rather than concepts, he 
argues that explication is a relation among expressions (the explicandum and 
the explicatum), each of which is part of a language (the explicandum and the 
explicatum language), a set of criteria of adequacy, and an explicative 
introduction (intuitively, the characterization of the explicatum). Each of these 
six constituents is defined in a purely formal way. Based on these six 
constituents of an explication, Cordes identifies four different types of 
explication alternatives – four types of pairs of explications of the same 
explicandum, whose members differ in various respects (for instance, they may 
be equivalent with respect to the criteria of adequacy identified while different 
with respect to the explicative introduction). Cordes’ enterprise can be 
characterized as an explication of explication; and he picks up this idea in the 
last section of his paper, applying the apparatus developed in the previous 
section to his own proposal. 
Catarina Dutilh Novaes’s contribution focuses on the revisionary 
character of Carnapian explication. In “Carnapian Explication and 
Ameliorative Analysis: A Systematic Comparison", she investigates similarities 
and differences between Carnap’s method of explication and Sally Haslanger’s 
method of ameliorative analysis, which is also revisionary in nature. Dutilh 
Novaes focuses on the importance of the methods of explication and of 
ameliorative analysis for political and social life and claims that both can 
contribute to social reforms – which might seem surprising, especially in the 
case of Carnapian explication. As Dutilh Novaes instructively displays, both 
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methods are influenced by different philosophical schools and were introduced 
with different agendas. Carnap’s method of explication is influenced by his 
view on rational scientific practice and rational theory formation in science, 
which traces back to the Vienna Circle. Its significance for social change may 
not be immediately evident. Haslanger’s method, in contrast, is influenced by 
the critical theory of the Frankfurt School. Dutilh Novaes not only explores the 
historical relations of both methods but also compares both methods with 
respect to the above mentioned change in subject objection (which is also 
addresses by Mark Pinder and Eve Kitsik in this S.I.) and with respect to their 
adequacy requirements. Finally, she shows that both methods are 
complementary and can benefit from each other. 
Whereas Dutilh Novaes discusses the importance of explication and 
ameliorative projects for non-theoretical purposes, Eve Kitsik focuses on 
explication and its significance for the clarification of central concepts and 
positions in theoretical philosophy. In her contribution “Explication as a 
Strategy for Revisionary Philosophy", she too shows that Carnapian explication 
can play a central role for revisionary philosophy. According to Kitsik, 
revisionary philosophy is concerned with the project of challenging beliefs that 
philosophers are very confident of. This project is motivated by the fact that 
some beliefs that initially seem very plausible can turn out to be implausible 
when their content is investigated more thoroughly. She focuses on two 
revisionary projects: revisionary ontology and radical skepticism. Kitsik argues 
that philosophers engaged with such projects should make it explicit that they 
depart from the everyday use of “Fs exist" and “S knows that p", respectively. 
Such departure, however, faces two main worries - the unintelligibility worry 
and the aforementioned topic shift worry, or change in subject objection. Roughly, 
according to the unintelligibility worry, if the use of philosophical notions or 
claims departs from the everyday use of them, then their “philosophical 
counterparts" are not intelligible. According to the topic shift worry, a 
departure from everyday use of notions such as “Fs exist" and “S knows that 
p" changes the topic and does not address original worries. Kitsik discusses the 
worries in detail and alleviates them. According to Kitsik, questions and 
objections can be adequate in philosophical contexts that would be inadequate 
in everyday contexts. One reason for this is that in philosophical contexts the 
purpose is to achieve epistemic excellence, which is a more demanding purpose 
than is commonly aimed for in everyday contexts. 
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Martin Kusch and Robin McKenna discuss a related method in “The 
Genealogical Method in Epistemology”. They defend Edward Craig’s 
genealogical approach to an analysis of knowledge against objections. Craig 
himself believed his method to be linked to Carnapian explication (Craig 1987). 
On Craig’s view, identifying a function of the use of ‘knowledge’ in a state of 
nature and constructing, from there, a genealogical story which leads to an 
understanding of ‘knowledge’, will benefit our philosophical understanding of 
‘knowledge’, without relying on an analysis of the concept, in terms of 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. The objections Kusch 
and McKenna discuss are divided into four groups. The first concerns the 
details of Craig’s approach: that it (i) fails to identify the main function of 
knowledge ascriptions in general, or that it (ii) does not adequately address the 
various functions paradigmatic knowledge ascriptions may serve. The second 
group concern alleged methodological problems: that (iii) Craig focuses on a 
social kind, whereas any such project should focus on a natural kind of 
knowledge, provided not in the sociology of knowledge but in cognitive 
ethology, that (iv) Craig commits to problematic accounts of knowledge when 
suggesting that true belief is more fundamental than knowledge. The third 
kind of objection directly targets the genealogical method – that it is a purely 
fictional just so story whose alleged explanatory power is highly questionable 
(v). The final two objections concern consequences of Craig’s approach 
regarding possible normative implications of contextualism and relativism (vi, 
vii). 
The following four papers focus on various aspects of the peculiarities 
of philosophical investigations that are somehow related to the armchair: 
philosophical expertise, armchair philosophy and its relation to 
methodological naturalism, and the a priori/a posteriori distinction.  
In their paper “Philosophical Expertise Under the Microscope” Miguel 
Egler and Lewis Ross provide a new version of the so-called expertise defense 
in favor of armchair philosophy. In a nutshell, the argument is that 
philosophers’ reliance on intuitions in their reasoning is vindicated by their 
expertise. Egler and Ross’ version draws on a more fine-grained analysis of 
philosophical expertise. There are different methodological practices in 
philosophy, such as different uses of thought experiments, and thus different 
kinds of philosophical expertise. Each of these must be considered 
individually. Yet, either way, it is not the expertise of intuitions that vindicates 
their use but the expertise in philosophical practices. Egler and Ross illustrate 
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their ‘piecemeal’ version of the expertise defense with the example of ordinary 
language philosophy. 
Sebastian Lutz, in his paper “Armchair Philosophy Naturalized”, 
explores, first, the question of how conceptual engineering in philosophy 
relates to practices in the sciences, and suggests, second, some general 
conclusions about the synthetic/a priori distinction and its role in philosophy. 
In a nutshell, Lutz argues that a considerable part of the sciences is concerned 
with conceptual matters (analytic or conventional) and that, as a consequence, 
the naturalist, whose main contention is that philosophy should resemble the 
sciences in its methodology, need not require philosophy to abandon its well-
established procedures of conceptual clarification or engineering. Upon closer 
inspection, it turns out that philosophy is continuous with the sciences in 
precisely this respect. The discussion is framed in terms of Carnapian 
explication, and can be regarded as a defense of both, Carnapian armchair 
philosophy and conceptual engineering (à la Carnap) in the sciences against 
criticisms raised by William Demopoulos, David Papineau and Willard Van 
Orman Quine.   
Daniele Sgaravatti’s aim in his paper “Experience and Reasoning: 
Challenging the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction” is to expand upon an 
argument by Timothy Williamson against the significance of the a priori/a 
posteriori distinction. It is commonly assumed that knowledge is a priori when 
it is independent of experience, where knowledge is a posteriori when it 
depends on experience. Sgaravatti focuses on examining the nature of the 
dependencies in question. He aims to show that there is no characterization of 
said dependencies that would allow to draw the a priori/a posteriori distinction 
in a satisfying way. Either the characterizations do not allow for a priori 
knowledge or they lead to classifying paradigmatic instances of a priori beliefs 
as a posteriori beliefs or, on the opposite side, they classify too many beliefs as 
a priori. Sgaravatti illustrates this argument and defends it against objections. 
His diagnosis for the issue is that the role of experience in reasoning is neither 
purely enabling nor purely evidential. Reasoning skills are dependent on 
experience for their normative value. Their normative status depends on the 
experiences that constitute their acquisition and development. 
In his paper “On Question-Begging and Analytic Content”, Samuel 
Elgin is concerned with the clarification of the concept of question begging 
arguments.  He clarifies the concept in terms of analytic content illustrated by 
some cases: An argument begs the question just in case its conclusion is part of 
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the analytic content of the conjunction of its premises. Thereby, not all valid 
arguments beg the question. Analytic truth and analytic containment is 
understood roughly along Fregean lines. Elgin’s answer to the question of what 
goes epistemically wrong with question begging arguments is that one cannot 
use the premises to gain knowledge of the conclusion: It is impossible to know 
that the conjunction of the premises is true without knowing that the 
conclusion is true – provided that knowledge is closed under analytic 
parthood.  
The remaining two papers discuss topics in (meta-)metaphysics: 
something-from-nothing derivations, and the question if, and if so in which 
sense, metaphysical disputes are merely verbal. 
Alex Steinberg, in his “Pleonastic Propositions and the Face Value 
Theory”, deals with a recent realist response to nominalist doubts concerning 
the existence of abstract objects: pleonasticism. He discusses Stephen Schiffer’s 
pleonastic theory of propositions, according to which: propositions (i) are 
derivative, ‘pleonastic’ objects, and (ii) are referred to in propositional attitude 
ascriptions (the face value theory). Steinberg argues that (i) and (ii) generate a 
tension: if propositions are pleonastic, we should expect substantive truths 
about them to derive from unproblematic truths about non-pleonastic objects. 
But if attitude ascriptions already treat of propositions, substantive truths 
concerning which propositions are the contents of which attitudes (content 
ascriptions) have no obvious grounds in the non-pleonastic. Steinberg suggests 
that we should give up part (ii) of the account of propositions in response to 
the difficulty. In a first step, Steinberg argues that the main argument in favor 
of the face-value theory, which is based on the observation that we can quantify 
into the position of ‘that’-clauses in attitude ascriptions, is not decisive, since 
we can quantify into verb phrase and adjectival positions as well. Steinberg 
then shows how dropping the assumption dissolves the tension in the resulting 
theory: if (ii) is denied, we are free to claim that content ascriptions derive from 
propositional attitude ascriptions, which, crucially, are themselves 
ontologically innocent. Steinberg ends by arguing that this suggestion also 
explains some peculiarities noted by Schiffer of the alleged proposition 
designators that occur in propositional attitude ascriptions.  
In his paper “Why Metaphysical Debates are Not Merely Verbal (Or 
How to Have a Non-Verbal Metaphysical Debate)”, Mark Balaguer tackles the 
question of whether particular metaphysical debates are merely verbal, such as 
debates about the existence of objects in the past. His main thesis is that none 
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of these debates are, in principle, merely verbal. The key element of a merely 
verbal dispute is that the meaning of a core notion is understood differently by 
the participants. Taking the different meanings into account, the disagreement 
typically dissolves. Balaguer boils down the question at stake to the question 
of whether the metaphysical questions that drive the respective disputes can be, 
in principle, non-merely verbally debated. Employing a taxonomy of different 
kinds of metaphysical views, he then argues by means of an example that any 
of the debates in question allows for non-verbal debates if certain conditions 
are fulfilled, and he defends his argument against objections. One crucial 
condition is that the debate needs to be carried out in a language that has a thick 
semantics, i.e., a semantics that says that the sentences whose truth values are 
being debated have metaphysically weighty truth conditions--in other words, 
a semantics that says that the sentences in question could be true only if the 
relevant controversial metaphysical theory is true. 
 
Acknowledgements 
This S.I. originated from a workshop on philosophical methods, which was 
conducted by the three guest editors in June 2016 in Essen, Germany. We thank 
all its speakers and participants for their contributions. We are also grateful to 
our Synthese’s editor-in-chief Wiebe van der Hoek and our reviewers for all 
their help and efforts. 
 
Funding 
The workshop on philosophical methods was co-funded by the German 
Research Foundation, the German Society for Analytic Philosophy, and the 
Volkswagen Foundation Project “A Study in Explanatory Power”. Anna-Maria 
A. Eder’s research was funded by the Austrian Science Fund (Erwin 
Schrödinger Program) through the research project Higher-Order Evidence 
(reference number J 3783-G24) at Northeastern University, Boston. Insa 
Lawler’s research was funded by the “A Study in Explanatory Power” project 
at the University of Duisburg-Essen and by the OeAD through an Ernst Mach 
Scholarship at the University of Salzburg. Raphael van Riel’s research was 
funded by the “A Study in Explanatory Power” project at the University of 
Duisburg-Essen. All this financial support is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
 
 
10 
 
References 
Balcerak Jackson, M. (2013). Conceptual Analysis and Epistemic Progress. 
Synthese, 190(15):3053-3074. 
Balcerak Jackson, M. and Balcerak Jackson, B. (2012). Understanding and 
Philosophical Methodology. Philosophical Studies, 161(2):185-205. 
Boniolo, G. (2003). Kant's Explication and Carnap's Explication: The Redde 
Rationem. International Philosophical Quarterly, 43(171):289-298. 
Bovens, L. and Hartmann, S. (2003). Bayesian Epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Brendel, E. (2013). Wissen. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter. 
Brun, G. (2016). Explication as a Method of Conceptual Re-engineering. 
Erkenntnis, 81(6):1211-1241. 
Burgess, A. and Plunkett, D. (2013). Conceptual Ethics I & II. Philosophy 
Compass, 8(12): 1091-1110. 
Carnap, R. (1963). Replies and Systematic Expositions. In: Schilpp, P.A. (eds.), 
The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, La Salle (IL): Open Court, 859-1013. 
Chalmers, D. and Jackson, F. (2001). Conceptual Analysis and Reductive 
Explanation, Philosophical Review, 110(3): 315-361. 
Craig, E. (1987) The Practical Explication of Knowledge. Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, 87: 211-226. 
Craig, E. (1990). Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual 
Synthesis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Earman, J. (1992). Bayes or Bust? Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press. 
Eder, AM. A. (manuscript). On Explicating ‘Epistemic Rationality’. 
Grice, H.P. (1958). Postwar Oxford Philosophy. In: Grice, H.P. (1989), Studies in 
the Way of Words, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 171-180. 
Fassio, D. and McKenna, R. (2015). Revisionary Epistemology. Inquiry, 58(7-
8):755-779. 
Grundmann, T. and Horvath, J. (2014). Thought Experiments and The Problem 
of Deviant Realizations. Philosophical Studies, 170(3):525-533. 
Hanna, J.F. (1968). An Explication of ` Explication'. Philosophy of Science, 35(1):28-
44. 
Haslanger, S. (2000). Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want 
Them To Be? Noûs, 34(1):31-55. 
Haslanger, S. (2012). Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
11 
 
Horvath, J. and Grundmann, T. (eds.) (2012). Experimental Philosophy and Its 
Critics. London: Routledge. 
Huber, F. and Schmidt-Petri, C. (eds.) (2009). Degrees of Belief. Dordrecht/New 
York: Springer. 
Jackson, F. (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics. A Defense of Conceptual Analysis. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Justus, J. (2012). Carnap on Concept Determination: Methodology for 
Philosophy of Science. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2(2):161-179. 
Knobe, J. and Nichols, Sh. (eds.) (2008). Experimental Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Kornblith, H. (2007). Naturalism and Intuitions. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 
74(1):27-49. 
Kornblith, H. (2014). A Naturalistic Epistemology: Selected Papers. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Leitgeb, H. (2013). Scientific Philosophy, Mathematical Philosophy, and All 
That. Metaphilosophy, 44(3):267-275. 
Leitgeb, H. (2014). The Stability Theory of Belief. Philosophical Review, 
123(2):131-171. 
Leitgeb, H. (2015). The Humean Thesis on Belief. Aristotelian Society 
Supplementary Volume, 89(1):143-185. 
Mach, E. (1973). On Thought Experiments. Translation by S. Krimsky. The 
Philosophical Forum, 4(3):446-459. 
Maher, P. (2007). Explication Defended. Studia Logica: An International Journal 
for Symbolic Logic, 86(2):331-341. 
Malmgren, A.S. (2011). Rationalism and the Content of Intuitive Judgements. 
Mind, 120(478):263-327. 
Nimtz, C. (2009). Conceptual Truth Defended. In: Kompa, N., Nimtz, C. and 
Suhm, C. (eds.), The A Priori and Its Role in Philosophy, Paderborn: mentis 
2009:137-155. 
Nimtz, C. (2010). Thought Experiments as Exercises in Conceptual Analysis. 
Grazer Philosophische Studien, 81(1):189-214. 
Nimtz, C. (2012). Begriffsanalyse heute. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung, 
66(2):218-247. 
Olsson, E.J. (2005). Against Coherence: Truth, Probability, and Justification. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Olsson, E.J. (2015). Gettier and the Method of Explication: A 60 Year Old 
Solution to a 50 Year Old Problem. Philosophical Studies, 172(1):57-72. 
12 
 
Pearl, J. (2000). Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Quine, W.V.O. (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review, 
60(1):20-43. 
Quine, W.V.O. (1960). Word and Object. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press. 
Rudder Baker, L. (2001). Philosophy in Mediis Rebus. Metaphilosophy, 32(4):378-
394. 
Schupbach, J. (2017). Experimental Explication. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 94(3):672-710. 
Schupbach, J. and Sprenger, J. (2011). The Logic of Explanatory Power. 
Philosophy of Science, 78(1):105-127. 
Siegwart, G. (1997a). Explikation. Ein methodologischer Versuch. In: Löffler, 
W., Runggaldier, E. (eds.), Dialog und System. Otto Muck zum 65. Geburtstag, 
Academia, Sankt Augustin:15-45. 
Siegwart, G. (1997b). Vorfragen zur Wahrheit. Ein Traktat über kognitive Sprachen. 
München: Oldenbourg. 
Spohn, W. (2012). The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and its Philosophical 
Applications. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Strawson, P.F. (1963). Carnap's Views on Constructed Systems versus Natural 
Languages in Analytic Philosophy. In: Schilpp, A. (eds.), The Philosophy of 
Rudolf Carnap, La Salle (IL): Open Court:503-518. 
van Riel, R. (2014). The Concept of Reduction. Dordrecht/New York: Springer. 
Williamson, T. (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
 
 
